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This is a comprehensive large-sample study of Australian earnings management. 
Using a sample of 4,844 firm-year observations across nine Australia industries from 
2000 to 2006, we find substantial corporate earnings management activity across 
several Australian industries. We document strong evidence of size and return on 
assets being primary determinants of earnings management in Australia.  The effects 
of size and return on assets are also found to be dominant in both income-increasing 
and income-decreasing earnings manipulation. We also document that that periphery 
sector firms are more likely to involve larger magnitude of earnings management than 
firms in the core sector.  
 
Keywords:    Earnings management, discretionary accruals, income-
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In recent years, as accounting scandals such as Enron and WorldCom in US 
and HIH in Australia have been widely reported, the issue of earnings management 
has attracted attention of regulators and academics. Regulators are increasingly 
concerned about the extent to which disclosed financial information distorts the true 
information underlying the business economics of a firm. To date, most of the 
academic research provides evidence of earnings management when managerial 
incentives are expected to be strongly associated in earnings management behaviour.  
For example, structure of executive compensation and timings of equity offerings are 
known to be related to earnings management practices (Teoh et al., 1998a, 1998b; 
Erickson & Wang, 1999; Louis, 2004; Bergstresser & Philippon, 2006). However, 
there is little examination of the pervasiveness and frequency of earnings management 
in a broader context.  
In this paper, we undertake a broad large-sample study of earnings 
management activities in Australia between 2000 and 2006.  A primary reason for us 
to carry out this study is to shed light on whether earnings management practices are 
attributed to only a few occasions based on managerial incentive reasons or is it more 
widespread?  Managers use flexibilities within the accounting standard to choose 
accounting methods, policies and estimates in the financial reporting process. A 
common assumption in incentive based studies of earnings management is that 
managers use this flexibility to distort financial information in order to maximize their 
own utility.  However, it is also true that managers can use the same flexibility to 
adjust the reported earnings as a signal to reflect firms’ future prospects (Holthausen, 
1990; Healy & Palepu, 1993; and Guay et al.,1996). An examination of the level and 
degree of earnings management in a larger economy-wide context, therefore, can help 
regulators prescribe an optimal level of management judgement and discretion for 
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corporations. Evidence of widespread earnings management practice may prompt 
regulators to consider additional disclosure requirements. On the other hand, 
regulators may further promote discretion in financial reporting as a device to increase 
the value of financial reporting or as a mechanism to facilitate effective 
communication.    
Gathering evidence regarding the scope and frequency of earnings 
management is also important because of its symptomatic relationship with earnings 
quality. Earnings are highly correlated with stock prices and some of the largest 
companies in the world have their stock performances consistently manipulated by 
earnings management techniques. The notion of earnings quality, therefore, is a major 
factor and concern in evaluating an entity’s financial health and reliability of reported 
earnings (Beaver et al, 1968; Bernard, 1995; Ohlson, 1995; Feltham & Ohlson, 1995; 
Green & Segal, 1966). A further motivation for our study comes from recent concern 
of the Australian Securities and Investments Commission (ASIC) over perception of 
possible accounting abuses and earnings quality in Australia1. ASIC, in response to 
financial reporting scandals in the U.S., and to some extent in Australia, decided to 
increase its corporate surveillance activities in 20022. We therefore argue that it is 
important to examine the level and degree of earnings management practice in the 
Australian context to gauge a broad sense of “earnings quality” in Australia.  
Using 4,844 firm-year observations during the period of 2000 to 2006 in 
Australia, we first find that earnings management is prevalent across several 
industries. Firms in Energy, Metals & Mining, Industrials, and Information 
Technology are found to engage in income-decreasing earnings management while 
Health Care and Telecommunication & Utilities are associated with income-
                                                 
1 For a comprehensive account of accounting frauds in Australia and specifically at HIH see “The inside Story of 
Australian’s Biggest Corporate Collapse” by Westfield and Wiley (2003). 
2 Concerned with the US corporate scandals, the chairman of ASIC David Knott instituted a new surveillance 
project ‘directed at American-style accounting abuses’ in Australia (Buffini, 2002).  
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increasing earnings manipulation. We also find that the aggregate magnitude of 
earnings management is greater for periphery sector firms than those in core sectors. 
The positive association between periphery sector and earnings management is 
significant even after controlling for firm-level characteristics. We also present 
evidence that a large degree of earnings management takes place in small size firms 
and firms with low profitability. Interestingly, however, the direction of earning 
manipulation by smaller firms appears to be bi-directional, as these firms seem to 
engage in both income-increasing and income-decreasing earnings management. 
There is also evidence, to suggest that the earnings manipulation activity is related 
with firms having higher levels of cash flows.  
Our study makes several contributions in this area. First, despite substantial 
research on earnings management in the U.S., Australian research has been quite 
limited. These studies are mostly limited in scope and are small sample studies3. As 
such, our study investigates the overall breadth and scope of earnings management 
behavior in a broad context through a comprehensive analysis of reported earnings 
across Australian industry sectors and individual firm characteristics. Second, this 
study should be of interest to investors and regulators. The level of pervasiveness of 
earnings management practices in specific industries and the association of these 
practices with firm characteristics can help investors assess the overall quality of 
financial reporting.  Third, the Australian capital market structure differs from that in 
                                                 
3 Australian studies encompassing a broad scope of earnings management are non existent except Holland and 
Ramsay (2005) who use the distribution method approach to find if firms engage in earnings management to beat 
revenue benchmarks. Other studies which cover Australian firms are the following. Lim & Matolcsy (1999) 
investigate association between product price controls established by the Australian government in the early1970s 
and reported net income. Eddey & Taylor (1999) investigate whether acquiring firms overstate their earnings in the 
quarter preceding a stock swap announcement. Jones and Sharma (2001) document evidence on earnings 
management in Australian’s ‘old’ and ‘new’ economy sectors. Wells (2002) and Godfrey et al. (2003) document a 
downward earnings manipulation in the years of CEO change. Monem (2003) finds income-decreasing earnings 
management in Australian gold-mining firms to reduce income tax after the introduction of 1991 Australian Gold 





the U.S.  The capital market in Australia is relatively small and highly concentrated 
within resources and industrial stocks compared to the U.S market. Analysts 
following in Australia are fewer and the regulatory scrutiny level of Australian market 
is argued to be lower than that of U.S (Chan et al. 2002). Also, the accounting 
standards, institutional structure, and corporate governance are expected to be 
different from those in the U.S.  For instance, the frequency of financial reporting is 
twice per year in Australia while in the U.S it is four times per year. Given all these 
differences, a comprehensive study in the Australian context is warranted. 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 provides a background 
on important research issues of earnings management. Section 3 develops the research 
design and describes the data. Section 4 presents the empirical results. Section 5 
reports results of supplementary analyses to test the robustness of our main results. 
Section 6 concludes the paper.  
2.  Earnings Management Background  
The study of earnings management has now grown into a dynamic body of 
empirical literature and conceptual framework. Based on agency theory, the explicit 
and implicit contracts between the firm and stakeholders offer a range of incentives 
for managers to engage in earnings manipulations. A substantial body of research 
focus on capital market motives where managers manipulate earnings in an attempt to 
influence short-term stock performance. These studies are primarily focused on 
whether earnings management takes place in the presence of specific managerial 
incentives. One stream of research examines specific capital market events such as th 
initial public offerings (IPOs) and seasonal equity offerings (SEOs) where managers 
of firms with pending public issues may manage the earnings reported in their 
 4
 
prospectuses in the hope of receiving a higher price for their shares.4 The other stream 
of research relies on the analysis of the discontinuity of earnings distribution. This 
stream suggests that earnings benchmarks provides a strong incentive for earnings 
manipulation since missing a benchmark will cause significant negative impact on 
stock valuation (Bartov et al., 2000; Skinner & Sloan, 2002). Researchers are also 
motivated to measure the economic consequence of earnings management (Dechow et 
al., 1996; Xie 2001 and Core et al., 2007).  
Arguments presented in above studies take the view of earnings management 
as an opportunistic behaviour by management which should have a negative impact 
on future firm performance. Researchers now acknowledge that earnings management 
per se is not negative in its implications for the earnings of a firm.  Earnings 
management practice, if used as a signalling tool, may serve to signal future 
opportunities of firms and project the ‘managerial style’ of firms in managing the 
earnings of firms.  Holthausen (1990), Healy & Palepu (1993) and Guay et al. (1996) 
document managers’ use of discretionary accruals to better reflect the impacts of 
underlying economic events on firm performance.  Subramanyam (1996), Hochberg 
et al. (2004) suggests that managers’ use of discretion can provide useful information 
to both existing stakeholders and prospective investors and find that discretionary 
accruals are positively associated with future stock returns. 
In our study, we do not necessarily seek to identify the reasons for earnings 
manipulation activities of Australian firms but offer comprehensive evidence of such 
on the basis of industry and individual firm characteristics. Industry classification has 
                                                 
4 Teoh, Wong and Rao (1998) find that reported earnings of firms are unusually high at the time of both IPOs and 
SEOs and such unusual high earnings are attributed to discretionary accruals. Rangan (1998) and Teoh, Welch and 
Wong (1998a, 1998b) further document that IPO and SEO firms under-perform the market in the years following 
their offerings. Erickson & Wang (1999) find acquiring firms exhibit income-increasing accruals prior to stock-
based acquisitions, as directors try to convince shareholders that the bid price is inadequate relative to earnings so 
that they can reject the bid. Louis (2004) not only confirms that acquiring firms overstate their earnings in the 





proved to be of considerable significance in prior research in the area of earnings 
management. Previous research has identified industry variation in earnings 
managements practice. For example, McNichols and Wilson (1998) find income-
decreasing manipulation in printing and publishing, nondurable wholesale goods, and 
business services industries. Teoh et al. (1998a) show over 30% firms who report 
higher net income before SEO are from electronic equipment and service industries. 
Beasley et al. (2000) document earnings management occurred in technology firms 
and financial-services firms. Nelson et al. (2002) report that significantly more 
earnings management attempts by firms in the electronics industry. The industry 
variation is not only present across individual industries but also through a dual 
economy perspective. The dual economy perspective of earnings management 
supposes that an economy can be classified as core and periphery sectors.  In this 
dichotomous classification, periphery sector firms face higher degrees of 
environmental uncertainty and a restricted opportunity structure and therefore are 
more predisposed to manage earnings than core sector firms (Belkaoui and Picur, 
1984; Albrecht and Richardson, 1990; Kinnunen et al. 1995)5.  The only study of 
earnings management with the dual economy approach in Australia is by Jones and 
Sharma (2001) who report significantly lower frequency of earnings management in 
the “new economy’ firms.   In our study, we examine earnings management practice 
of firms by categorizing our sample into core and periphery sectors (see section 4 for 
details). 
To examine the scope and frequency of earnings management, firm 
characteristics and their contribution to a higher or lower propensity for earnings 
                                                 
5 This research of classifying dual industry classification system is based on Averitt (1968) who defines an 
economy as a composite of two business systems to be called the core and the periphery. Bluestone et al. (1973) 
describe that ‘the core economy is by far the largest sector…with high productivity and profits, intensive 
utilization of capital, high incidence of monopoly power and a high degree of unionization…Unlike core sector 




management need to be considered.  Previous research has shown that firms that 
adjust earnings are smaller, less profitable, higher levered, lower growth compared 
with their industry counterparts (Kinney and McDaniel, 1989; Defond and Jiambalvo, 
1991; Callen et al., 2002; Beneish, 1999). We also examine earnings management 
behavior of Australian firms at the individual firm level through several 
characteristics known to be associated with earnings management. In the following, 
we outline these characteristics. 
Watts and Zimmerman (1978) identify firm size as a factor for determination 
of accounting numbers.  Otherwise known as the ‘political cost hypothesis’, they 
show that large size firms are politically more sensitive and are likely to attract higher 
political exposure. This political sensitivity suggests that managers of large firms are 
more likely to engage in income-decreasing earnings activities to reduce political 
exposure (also see Hagerman and Zmijewski, 1979; Bowen et al., 1981; Dhaliwal, 
1988). Holland and Jackson (2004) however have contrary views. They argue that 
large firms have incentives to avoid earnings management as they are subject to more 
scrutiny from analysts, investors, and the regulators. Bathke et al. (1989) document a 
positive relationship between firm size and earnings stability with the underlying 
implication that there is less need for large size firms to manage earnings because 
large firms have sufficient resources to diversify risk and to stabilize growth leading 
to a more stable earnings stream.  
A firm’s growth opportunities can provide managers with incentive to smooth 
earnings as uncertain opportunities are likely to cause earnings volatility. Faced with 
the increased perceived firm risk and therefore higher cost of capital, managers may 
have incentive to manage earnings (Beaver et al., 1968). Collins and Kothari (1989) 
and Easton and Zmijewski (1989) find that earnings response coefficients are a 
function of growth and risk. Skinner and Sloan (2001) find that the market severely 
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penalizes growth firms for negative earnings surprise. Richardson et al. (2002) also 
find that restatement firms tend to be high growth firms which are under pressure to 
meet or beat analysts’ forecasts. Pincus and Rajgopal (2002) and Young (1999) 
document a positive association between a firm’s growth level and earnings 
management activity. Firth et al. (2007) point out that fast growing firms may find it 
easier to engage in earnings management than mature firms since it is difficult to 
observe the business activities of fast growing firms. Thus, managers of high growth 
firms are likely to have strong incentives to meet earnings benchmarks.  
Profitability also affects the level of earnings management. Lower accounting 
profits provide motivation for firms to manipulate earnings because these firms are 
possibly facing financial constraints. White (1970) finds that firms with declining 
profitability tend to smooth earnings. Ashari et al. (1994) report that managers’ 
incentive to smooth earnings will be stronger when the firm’s profitability is poor and 
its fluctuations in income are severe. Wang (2004) argues that the firm’s propensity 
for fraud is positively related to growth prospects and negatively related to the 
profitability of the firm’s current assets. Related to the issue of profitability, 
rresearchers hypothesize that the degree of earnings management will also depend on 
the firm’s operating performance. When operating performance is unusually high (or 
low), managers tend to decrease (or increase) reported earnings. However, if 
operating performance is extremely poor, some firms may severely decrease income 
which is known as the ‘taking bath’ strategy (Healey, 1985). The rationale is that 
when the lower boundary of the earnings cannot be reached efficiently, it is better to 
go as low as possible to make the future earnings targets easier to meet. McNichols 
and Wilson (1988) use operating cash flow as a measure of firm operating 
performance find systematic difference in accounting discretions. Young (1999) finds 
that extreme positive cash flows are associated with negative discretionary accruals. 
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Yoon and Miller (2002) document the association between the operating performance 
and the earnings management behavior of Korean firms.  
Regardless of reasons to engage in earnings management, capital intensity of 
assets is a factor that indirectly affects the ability of managers to undertake earnings 
adjustment. Managers’ ability to exercise discretion over reported earnings depend on 
the levels of current versus non-current components of assets and liabilities. Capital 
intensity measures the portion of a firm’s non-current (fixed) assets to total assets 
base and thus is a measure of the lack of ability to manage earnings. Burgstahler and 
Dichev (1997) and Francis et al. (1999) find evidence that firms with large current 
assets and liabilities provide more maneuver room for the managers to exercise 
discretions through working capital accruals than otherwise. In a similar vein, Young 
(1999) reports a negative association between capital intensity and the level of 
discretionary accruals.   
Finally, previous studies have shown that high leverage firms tend to engage 
in earnings management in order to prevent breaches of debt covenants. DeFond and 
Jiambalvo (1994) find evidence of income-increasing earnings management in the 
year prior to actual covenant violation as managers try to report high income in order 
to influence creditors. However, DeAngelo & Skinner (1994) argue that managers of 
financially troubled firms would highlight a firm’s financial difficulties by reducing 
the reported earning so that they could obtain better terms in their contract 
renegotiations. Charitou et al. (2007) examine earnings management behaviour of 859 
U.S. bankruptcy firms over the period 1986 to 2004 and suggest that managers of 
highly distressed firms shift earnings downwards prior to the bankruptcy filing as way 
to blame the ‘old’ management for the distressed condition. Despite the varied 
arguments of whether high leverage firms engage in income-increasing or income-
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decreasing earnings management, it is apparent that a firm’s leverage affects earnings 
management.  
3. Research Design and Data Collection 
3.1.  Earnings Management Measures 
Accounting earnings comprise a cash flow component and an accruals 
component. Accruals are accounting entries that adjust for deficiencies of cash 
accounting, involving managerial discretion. Although accruals can be observed, it is 
very difficult for researchers to separate them into their non-discretionary components 
and a discretionary component that has been manipulated.  Non-discretionary accruals 
are necessary adjustments to the industry-related and firm-specific business 
conditions. For example, capital-intensive firms are expected to have high 
depreciation, while rapidly growing firms have, in general, more credit sales than cash 
sales. Discretionary accruals are viewed as a measure of earnings manipulation and 
are used as the proxy of earnings management. A widely used measure of earnings 
management through the discretionary accrual (DA) is the ‘Jones model’.  Jones 
(1991) proposes the total accrual as a function of changes in revenue and levels of 
property plant and equipment.  Specifically, the Jones model in a regression equation 
form is: 
 
itititititititit TAPPEaTAREVaTAaTATAC ε++Δ+= −−−− )/()/()/1(/ 1312111               (1) 
 
where i and t are indices for firms and time periods. TACit is total accruals being the 
difference between net operating income and operating cash flows. itREVΔ  is the 
change in net sales from period t-1 to t.  PPEit is net property, plant and equipment. 
Factors such as growth and inflations rate can cause the time series of economic 
variables to exhibit unequal variances over time. Therefore, all variables are scaled by 
lagged total assets, ,to reduce heteroscedasticity.  Of interest in this Hones 1−itTA
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model is the residual that is not dictated by firm conditions, and therefore, is the 
discretionary component. 
Despite the popularity of Jones (1991) model, empirical studies have pointed 
out that this discretionary accrual estimation model suffer from correlated omitted 
variables, and therefore is potentially misspecified (Dechow et al.,1995; 
Subramanyam, 1996; Kasznik, 1999; Bartov et al., 2000; Klein, 2002; Kothari et al., 
2005).  In good years, managers may want to hide some income for a future rainy day, 
while in bad years they may take “big baths” to clear the sky for future periods.  
Consistent with this view, Dechow et al. (1995) find the measurement errors in 
estimation of discretionary accruals are correlated with firm earnings performance - 
firms with low (high) earnings tend to have negative (positive) discretionary accruals. 
McNichols and Wilson (1988) find discretionary accruals are negatively associated 
with operating cash flows. In this vein, researchers argue that tests related to earnings 
management which do no control for a firm’s performance are misspecified.  The 
inference is particularly biased involving firms experiencing extreme financial 
performance. In order to address these estimation issues, Rees et al. (1996) expanded 
the original Jones model by including cash flow from operations as an additional 
explanatory variable when estimating normal total accruals. Defond and 
Subramanyam (1998) control for cash flows; Teoh et al., (1998a) control net income; 
Kasznik (1999) uses the median performance of firms matched on return on assets; 
Kothari et al. (2005) use performance matching on return on assets and use a 
percentile grouping method to avoid the non-linear relationship between return on 
assets and accruals. 
In this study, we attempt to mitigate above problems of model 
misspecification and potential correlation of discretionary accruals with performance 
by adjusting the Jones model in two ways. First, we estimate discretionary accruals by 
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using the following a variation of Jones model by including an additional variable, the 
change of operating cash flows, itCFΔ , to control for effect of operating cash flows.  
ititititititititit CFTAPPEaTAREVaTAaTATAC εα +Δ++Δ+= −−−− 41312111 )/()/()/1(/    (2) 
 
We then estimate equation (2) cross-sectionally and calculate the residuals to obtain 
the unadjusted discretionary accruals (DA).  Second, we employ the performance 
adjusted method similar to Kasznik (1999), to control for measurement errors in the 
discretionary accruals due to its correlation with earnings performance. We rank the 
DAs into percentile groups by their return on assets, defined as operating income 
deflated by lagged total assets (ROA it/ ). We then compute the median of each 
percentile and subtract it from each observation’s unadjusted discretionary accruals in 
that percentile. The rational for standardizing the residuals in this way is that that 
firms identified as having higher-than-median residuals are in fact managing earnings 
at a rate higher than the median performance firm. Spearman correlation coefficient 
between discretionary accruals and ROA before and after adjustment are 0.28980 (p-
value<0.0001) and -0.01767 (p-value=0.2188), respectively which validates the 
adjustment procedure. For ease of exposition, the performance-adjusted discretionary 
accruals are referred to as discretionary accruals hereafter.  
1−itTA
Large values of discretionary accruals are conventionally interpreted as 
evidence of earnings management. Under the null hypothesis that Australian firms do 
not engage in earnings management, the mean and median discretionary accruals are 
expected to be zero. In order to capture the dynamic nature of this discretionary 
accrual component of earnings, we also consider both the absolute and signed values. 
Absolute values are used to determine whether earnings management takes place at 
the aggregate level. The signs of discretionary accruals are expected to convey the 
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direction of earnings management. Positive (negative) discretionary accruals are 
indicators of income-increasing (income-decreasing) earnings manipulation activities.  
3.2. Data Collection 
The starting point for our sample is the population of all ASX listed firms in 
the DataStream database with annual accounting and market data from 2000 to 2006.  
In our sample we include the suspended and dead files to avoid potential survivorship 
bias. The initial sample includes 3,914 firms with 27,398 observations. We exclude all 
financial firms since their financial reporting requirements differ from those of 
industrial firms.  These include 45 banks, 194 equity investment instruments, 228 
general financial, 5 life insurance, 44 non-equity investment instruments, 19 nonlife 
insurance, 276 real estate, altogether 811 firms and 5,677 observations. We also 
exclude 1,603 firm-year observations whose industry codes are unclassified by 
DataStream. Further, 13,926 firm-year observations (about 50%) are discarded since 
we require non-missing values for all variables in modelling discretionary accruals. 
we also exclude 11 firm-year observations involving restructuring activities.  In the 
analysis stage, to ensure our tests are not influenced by extreme outliers, we winsorize 
the top and the bottom 5 per cent observations by extreme values of discretionary 
accruals. These sampling criteria result in a final sample of 4,844 firm-year 
observations. Firm coverage varies from 119 firms in 2000 to 896 in 2006.   
Since our estimation procedure requires enough data points for meaningful 
regression, we combine industry groups in a given sample year with close GICS codes 
into single industry groups. For example, telecommunication services (GICS 5010) 
and utilities (GICS 5510) are combined. As Australian markets are dominated by 
mining industries, we also isolate this sector to see whether there is any industry 
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cluster effect. GICS consists of ten sectors6. Our classification of nine industries is 
based on the GICS structure with the financial sector being excluded.   
 This procedure of ensuring consistency with GICS structure results in nine 
industry groups with about 60% of the sample appearing in Metals & Mining (29.42 
per cent), Consumer Discretionary (17.09 per cent), and Information Technology 
(12.59 per cent) industry groups. Table 1 shows both industry-wise and year-wise 
distribution of the final sample.  This reflects some evidence of industry clustering in 
our sample. Although industry clustering could be a problem if empirical results are 
driven by a particular industry, we do not disaggregate the industry classification any 
further. Australian economy is dominated primarily by resource and consumer service.  
Our industry classification essentially mirrors the nature of Australian economy and 
therefore can avoid self-selection bias. One of the objectives of this study is to 
investigate the scope of earnings management practice across different industry 
sectors. Our industry classification, based on a consistent GICS structure to properly 
identifiable industry sectors, therefore, is appropriate. The determined sample can 
thus truly reflect earnings management practices in Australia. To the extent we do not 
draw our inferences on the basis of small sample size in one particular industry, we do 
not regard industry clustering is a problem in our study. 
In general, the incidences of available observations have steadily increased 
over the sample period. Higher frequencies of firm-year observations begin to appear 
after 2002 (9.74 percent in 2001, 6.60 percent in 2002), indicating higher levels of 
disclosures in financial reports as required by regulatory bodies.   
                                                 
6 GICS (Global Industry Classification Standard) is a joint Standard and Poor’s/Morgan Stanley Capital 
International classification system aimed at standardizing industry definitions. 
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4.  Empirical Results 
We estimate our Jones-based cash flow model (equation 2) cross-sectionally 
for each of the nine industry groups in each year from 2000 to 2006.  The mean 
coefficient estimates of annual cross-sectional regressions for 63 industry-year pairs 
are presented in Appendix (Table A1).  The coefficient estimates themselves are not 
of importance to draw inference about earnings management but hold some 
implications regarding the validity of our model. The mean coefficient estimate on 
change in revenue ( ) usually is ambiguous because a given change in sales can 
cause either income-increasing accruals (e.g. account receivables) or income-
decreasing accruals (e.g. account payables). We find that mean and median coefficient 
estimate on (i.e. α2) is positive and statistically significant from zero, with 68 
per cent of the estimates being positive implying that the change in sales is associated 
with income-increasing accruals in our sample. The coefficient on PPE should be 
negative since the level of property, plant and equipment is linked to income-
decreasing accruals such as depreciation, depletion and amortization. The mean 
coefficient of our regressions on PPE (α3) is negatively significant at 1 per cent level 
and 73 per cent of the estimates are negative. As expected, the mean coefficient on 
operating cash flows (α4) is negative and significant with only 17 per cent of the 
coefficient estimates being positive. Overall, with average R-square of 0.5305 and 
expected signs on the estimates, our modified Jones cash-flow model estimation 
procedure seem to capture the non-discretionary components of the accruals.  We now 
turn our attention to specific analyses of the discretionary accruals.  
REVΔ
REVΔ
4.1. Industry sectors 
Under the null hypothesis that firms do not engage in earnings management, 
we should expect to see the discretionary component of accruals (DA) to be zero. We 
test this proposition by examining the mean, median and proportion of 
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positive/negative DAs in our sample. We employ the Student’s-t test for mean, the 
Wilcoxon non-parametric signed rank test for median, and the binomial sign test for 
proportional differences and report the results in table 2.  
Four industries (metals and mining, industrials, health care and telecom and 
utilities) have DAs significantly different from zero. For each of these four industries, 
the mean, median are statistically significant from zero under standard p values. This 
is confirmed with the binomial test for equal proportion of positive and negative 
values. For example, the mean and median DA are -0.0016, -0.0011, respectively for 
the Metals and Mining industry with 719 negative DAs.  For this industry, the test 
statistics for mean, median and proportionality tests are significant with p values of 
0.0517, 0.0128 and 0.0506, respectively. In addition to these four industries, when 
wilcoxon and binomial tests are considered, two additional industries (energy and 
information technology) exhibit DAs to be significantly different from zero.  Taken 
together, there is evidence that earnings management is prevalent in six industries 
overall, with particularly strong evidence of earnings management in four of these six 
industries.  It is worthwhile to note here that four of these industries (energy, metals 
and mining, industrials and information technology) have income-decreasing 
discretionary accruals while the other two are associated with income-increasing 
accruals (healthcare and Telecommunication & Utilities). This evidence suggests that, 
between 2000 and 2006, there is an industry wide variation in the practice of earnings 
management.  The results in table 2 do not indicate earnings management practices 
among material, consumer discretionary, and consumer staples industries.  
The dual economy approach about earnings management posits that periphery 
sector firms are exposed to higher degrees of business uncertainty and a more 
restricted opportunity structure and are more likely to be exhibit higher frequency of 
earnings management than the core sector (Belkaoui and Picur, 1984). In this study, 
 16
 
we classify the nine Australian industries into core and periphery sectors by broadly 
following the Beck, Horan and Tolbert’s (1978) classification system as well as the 
most recent classification system used by the Australian Stock Exchange (ASX)7. 
According to the ASX, the Australian economy is dominated primarily by consumer 
service and in recent periods has experienced considerable growth in the so-called 
‘new economy’, comprising firms in information technology, biotechnology and 
healthcare. Accordingly, we define the core sector comprising of Energy, Material, 
Metals & Mining, Industrials, Consumer Discretionary, Consumer Staples.  Firms 
belonging to Information technology, Health Care and Telecommunication & Utilities 
are assigned to the periphery sector. This classification results in 3,623 of sample 
firm-year observations in the core sector (approximately 75 per cent) and 1,221 firm-
year observations in the periphery sector (approximately 25 per cent). 
We are not only interested in the difference between core and periphery sector 
in terms of overall earnings management over recent years, but we also want to know 
whether there is a difference in income-increasing or income-decreasing activity in 
these two sectors. We use absolute values of DAs to examine the magnitude and 
signed values for testing the directions of earnings manipulation. In conducting our 
tests, we categorise discretionary accruals into three initial cluster groups: (1) by 
values (with and without absolute values); (2) by extreme observations (high and low 
groups of absolute values); (3) by direction (positive and negative values), to examine 
the systematic differences between core and periphery sector firms. The results are 
presented in table 3. 
                                                 
7 Under Beck, Horan and Tolbert (1978) classification, Mining, Construction, Durable/Nondurable Manufacturing, 
Transportation, Communications, Utilities and Sanitary Services, Wholesale Trade, Finance, Insurance, and Real 
Estate, Professional and Related Services, and Public Administration are classified as core sector. Agriculture, 
Forestry, and Fisheries, Miscellaneous Durable/Nondurable Manufacturing, Nondurable Manufacturing, Retail 




 Table 3 reveals that, on average, greater accounting discretions occurred in 
the periphery sector than in the core sector. When the discretionary accruals are 
grouped according to their values (with and without absolute values), the mean and 
median DAs are lower for the core sector group.  For example, the overall mean DA 
for the core group is -0.0013 and lower than the overall average DA of 0.0122 of the 
periphery group with the difference being significantly different from zero (p-value 
below 0.0001). When we consider the absolute value of the DAs to examine the 
aggregate levels, the same pattern holds with the core group DA (mean, median 
0.0683 and 0.0557, respectively) significantly below that of the periphery group 
(mean, median 0.0746 and 0.0619, respectively).  
In order to examine the difference between the two industry groups, we also 
stratify the firms according to their aggregate level of DAs. Firms are classified into 
quartiles according to their absolute discretionary accrual values with the uppermost 
quartile being ‘high_DA’ firms and the lowest quartile comprising of ‘low_DA’ firms. 
On average, firms in high_DA (low_DA) quartile are expected to be associated with 
higher (lower) levels of earnings manipulation. Table 3 shows that the mean and 
median DAs for the high_DA group firms in the periphery sector are 0.1483 and 
0.1454, respectively, which are significantly greater than the mean (0.1445) and 
median (0.1401) of the high_DA group in the core sector. The differences in mean 
and medians are statistically significant with p-values of 0.0381 for difference in 
means and 0.0383 for difference in medians. 
When the low_DA grouping is considered, the difference between core and 
periphery sectors is insignificant with p-value equal to 0.4801 and 0.4965 for 
differences of mean and median of DAs, respectively.  This implies that periphery 
sectors firms exhibiting higher levels of DAs are quite likely driven by a group 
engaging in extreme earnings manipulation. This result is further bolstered by 
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considering the proportion of overall sample in each of the dual economy group for 
the extreme DA quartiles. The frequency of high_DA group is 28 per cent and higher 
for the periphery sector compared to 24 per cent for the core. The corresponding 
percentages for the low_DA groups are 22 per cent and lower for periphery firms 
while 26 per cent of these firms are in the core.   
Next we examine the broad directions of earnings management activity in 
these two dual sectors. In table 3, we group discretionary accruals into positive 
discretionary accruals (+DA, income increasing) group and negative discretionary 
accruals (−DA, income decreasing) group for both core and periphery sectors. 
Difference in mean and medians suggest that periphery sector firms engage in more 
income-increasing earnings management than those in the core sector. Both the mean 
(0.0799 versus 0.0689) and median (0.0649 versus 0.0556) +DA for the periphery 
sector are greater than those of the core sector and the differences are statistically 
significant at less than 1 per cent. In terms of frequency, 54 per cent firms in 
periphery sector report positive discretionary accruals, which is more frequent than 
the core group at 48 per cent.   However, if we examine the evidence regarding 
income decreasing activity (-DA) there is no evidence to suggest either core or the 
periphery group behave differently during our sample period.  
Overall, it appears that the periphery sector firms are more likely to engage in 
earnings management than the periphery sector firms.  Nonetheless, the core sector 
firms do exhibit earnings management in an income-decreasing fashion while the 
periphery sector firms are practicing in the traditional form of earnings management 
by income-increasing behavior.  Although this is beyond the scope of the paper, one 
possible reason could be that given our sample period coincides with the recent boom 
in resource sector in Australia and predominance of resource based firms in our 
sample, the firms may be engaging in ‘income smoothing’. 
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4.2. Association between earnings management and firm characteristics 
Next we turn our attention to analysing the discretionary accruals and examine 
if the cross sectional relationship between the DAs and underlying firm-level 
characteristics.  
4.2.1 Discretionary accruals portfolios 
Following McNichols and Wilson (1988) and Kothari et al. (2005), we form 
portfolios of DAs to examine discretionary accruals. We construct ten portfolios 
according to the decile ranking of the absolute values of DA (abs_DA) to examine the 
magnitude of earnings management attributed to firm characteristics.  In order to 
examine the direction of earning manipulation, we split the DAs into positive (+DA) 
and negative (-DA) accruals groups and construct similar decile portfolios within each 
group.  
Table 4 presents the average size, growth opportunity, profitability, capital 
intensity, operating cash flows and leverage within each abs_DA portfolios. By 
construction, one can interpret firms in the extreme decile portfolios in our sample to 
possess the highest and lowest levels of aggregate earnings manipulation 
characteristics. Our lowest decile portfolio (portfolio-1) has a mean absolute DA of 
0.0050 and the highest decile portfolio has mean DA of 0.17528. We observe that as 
the absolute discretionary accruals increase, the firm size decreases. Portfolio-10 
(High abs_DA) seems to be comprised of smallest firms with mean logarithm of total 
assets being 9.8603 while the portfolio-1 (Low abs_DA) has the largest firms with 
mean logarithm of total assets of 11.001. The relationship between size and abs_DA 
appear to be negatively monotonous by portfolios. The difference of firm sizes 
between two extreme portfolios is significant with t-statistics of 8.45 (p<0.0001).  
                                                 
8 The mean DA of portfolio-1 is statistically close to zero under p-value of 5%.  The mean DA of portfolio-10 is 
statistically different from zero.  We do not report these statistics in our decile DA portfolio analyses.  
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When we consider growth opportunity (GROWTH), the relationship also 
appears to be related to high DAs with high growths tending to occur in portfolios 7, 8, 
9 and 10. This indicates that firms with high abs_DA are likley to exhibit faster 
growth rate than lower abs_DA firms. However, the relationship between growth and 
abs_DA is likely to be non-linear since the difference between portfolio 1 and 10 is 
insignificant (p=0.1470).  Profitability (ROA) and operating cash flows (CF) tend to 
become poorer when absolute discretionary accruals are of increasing nature.  It is 
also interesting to note that both ROA and CF have negative means across all our 
portfolios, indicating a strong association of earnings management with less profitable 
and poor cash flow firms.  In table 4, the High abs_DA portfolio has much lower 
profitability measure (−0.44) than the Low abs_DA portfolio (−0.028). This 
difference is significant at 5 percent. Correspondingly, cash flows for High abs_DA 
portfolio (−0.2743) are poorer than that of Low abs_DA portfolio (−0.0105) and the 
difference is significant at less than 1 per cent.  Previous evidence suggest that firms 
engaged in earnings manipulation are likely to be firms with operating cash flow and 
profitability problems and the evidence presented in this table appears to support this 
notion for Australian firms during our sample period. According to the taking-a-bath 
hypothesis, when operating performance is poor, managers tend to increase earnings; 
however, if the operating performance is extremely poor, some firms may decrease 
income further. If managers attempt to take an opportunity of negative earnings in any 
particular period to depress earnings further then the negative earnings are likely to be 
clustered. We find some indirect evidence to support this conjecture in table 4 by 
noting that the highest abs_DA portfolio (portfolio-10) has not only a very high level 
of mean CF (-0.2743) but also this average is almost four times the CF mean of 
portfolio-9.  As regards to the CIR characteristic, the measure for capital intensity, 
when we test the difference across the extreme portfolios, this factor is statistically 
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higher for the high abs_DA portfolio (p=0.0122). Although this evidence is contrary 
to the general intuition that firms with low CIR should have high DAs, the pattern is 
somewhat irregular across the portfolios. There is no specific association between the 
magnitude of earnings management and leverage. We do not observe any pattern for 
changes in LEVERAGE. This observation is confirmed with the t-test for the 
difference of leverage between High abs_DA and Low abs_DA showing no 
significant difference.  
We also examine whether firm characteristics affect the direction of earnings 
management. Table 5 presents the mean of the same firm characteristics (size, growth 
opportunity, profitability, capital intensity, operating cash flows and leverage) of 
decile portfolios of two groups of positive and negative discretionary accruals. In 
panel A of table 5, when the income-increasing discretionary accruals are considered 
(+DA), we observe that small size, poor profit, and poor cash flows firms are more 
likely to involve in income-increasing earnings manipulation. The average size of the 
portfolio decrease as +DA increases with the smallest size being 9.5033 for the 
highest +DA portfolio (portfolio-10).  Although patterns for profitability and cash 
flows are not as monotonous as firm size, we observe that the mean ROA and CF for 
high +DA firms are higher than those of the low +DA firms.  Testing for the extreme 
deciles, we find that the differences are statistically significant (p values of 0.0494 
and 0.0038 for ROA and CF, respectively).  
Panel B in table 5 examines income-decreasing earnings accruals (−DA) and 
confirms the role of size and ROA in determining the directional effect of earnings 
manipulation Consistent with earlier evidence, smaller and lower ROA firms tend to 
be associated with income-decreasing earnings management. The evidence is 
particularly strong with the size factor, with the average size steadily decreasing as the 
–DAs become more negative.  The average size in extreme deciles are significantly 
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different (p=0.0008).  The evidence regarding ROA shows that, most high income-
decreasing accruals are concentrated in firms with low ROA.  In table 5, panel B, the 
mean ROA of portfolio-10, a decile portfolio of extreme –DAs, is -0.2072 and 
statistically different from that of the portfolio-1 (p=0.0026).  Taken together, 
evidence presented in panel A and B shows that size and return on assets play large 
roles in determining the direction of earnings manipulation.  Smaller size firms and 
firms with low return on assets firms are more likely to engage in earnings 
management and in both direction 9 .  These results are further confirmed in our 
regression analysis later. 
 In addition to size and ROA, we find some weak evidence that high capital 
intensity firms tend to engage in more income-decreasing earnings management. 
Difference of CIR between highest negative DA firms (portfolio 10) and lowest 
negative DA firms (portfolio 1) is significant (p=0.0081).  Although this difference is 
present between extreme portfolios, the pattern is much less clear across the decile 
portfolios. 
Overall, on the basis of evidence presented in table 4 and 5, we suggest that 
size and profitability play significant roles in earnings management behaviour of 
Australian firms between 2000 and 2006. Moreover, smaller size and less profitable 
firms are associated with both income-increasing and decreasing earnings 
management activities.  The results regarding size is quite strong and is consistent 
with evidence of U.S. firms by Sloan (1996). In terms of firm profitability and cash 
flows, our results are consistent with Kinney and McDaniel (1989) who find that 
firms who restate their earning figures are likely to be less profitable, and McNichols 
                                                 
9 Interestingly, the average ROA for the portfolio of firms with extreme income-decreasing accruals is much lower 
than that of the extreme portfolio of income-increasing accruals (-0.6636 versus -0.2072). 
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and Wilson (1988) Dechow (1994) who find that firms with unusually poor operating 
cash flows tend to have higher accruals.  
4.3.2 Logit regression analysis 
We also use logit regressions to model earnings management behaviour.  We 
use logit analysis to gauge the marginal impact of independent variables of firm 
characteristics and economic sectors on the choice variable of earnings manipulation. 
Moreover, the non-linear relationship between discretionary accruals and firm 
characteristics that we have observed in our portfolio analyses earlier is better 
modelled through binary dependent variable analysis. The model is represented as 
follows: 











=                                                                                          (3) 
Where P(i) is the probability of earnings management by firm i, which is also the 
response variable. X(i) is a vector of independent firm characteristics for firm firm i in 
year t ( SIZE(it), GROWTH(it),  ROA(it), CF(it), CIR(it), LEVERAGE(it) and SECTOR(it) ); 
β  is the regression coefficient vector.  Independent variables are continuous except 
SECTOR(it) which is a binary variable if firm i is in periphery sector and 0 otherwise 
  In order to test the marginal effects on aggregate level of earnings 
management, we set the dependent indicator variable to be 1 if the observation is 
above the median value when ranked by absolute values of discretionary accruals and 
zero otherwise. The likelihood-ratio, Hosmer and Lemeshow goodness-of-fit test 
statistic and prediction accuracy are used to evaluate model fitting. The explanatory 
power of the model is determined by Max-rescaled R2. 
Table 6 presents the aggregate magnitude of earnings management in the 
presence of firm characteristics and economy sector classification. It shows that there 
is a high probability that if a firm is small (negative coefficient, p<0.0001), high 
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growth (positive coefficient, p=0.0525), less profitable (negative coefficient, 
p=0.0420), with poor cash flows (negative coefficient, p= 0.0190) and high capital 
intensity (positive coefficient, p<0.0001), it is more likely to engage in higher levels 
of earnings management. This result confirms the broad results regarding the 
aggregate levels of earnings manipulation contained in table 4. In table 6, although 
leverage has positive association with the magnitude of earnings management, Wald 
Chi-Sq for this coefficient is 1.2763 and insignificant (p=0.4877). The logistic 
regression also shows a significantly positive coefficient estimate for periphery sector 
(p=0.001). Controlling for the effects of underlying firm characteristics, the economy 
sector of a firm is still a determinant of the magnitude of earnings management. 
Consistent with earlier evidence regarding economic sectors, we find that periphery 
sector firms have larger magnitude of earnings management compared with core 
sector firms. The overall F-test (not reported) for the null hypothesis that all 
parameters of interest are jointly zero is rejected with chi-square value of 12.5021 (p-
value=0.0004). 
Next, we test the effect of firm characteristics and economy sectors on the 
direction of earnings management. To test this, we set the dependent indicator 
variable to be 1 if the firm is in the upper half of positive discretionary accruals group 
and zero otherwise. We repeat the regression procedure for the negative discretionary 
accruals by splitting the group above median with the independent variable being 1 
for high negative DAs and 0 for the low negative DAs.   
Table 7 (panel A) shows that firms with smaller size, (negative coefficient, 
p<0.0001) lower ROA, (negative coefficient, p<0.0001), low cash flow (negative 
coefficient, p<0.0001), and higher leverage (positive coefficient, p=0.0427) are likely 
to engage in income-increasing earnings management. The negative coefficient on 
SIZE confirms our earlier finding of overall negative relationship of size and earnings 
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management. The estimated signs on coefficients of ROA and  CF are also consistent 
with earlier evidence (table 5) and with the general intuition is that managers try to 
boost reported earnings and profit when the true operating cash flows are poor 
(Fudenberg and Tirole, 1995; and McNichols and Wilson, 1988). The leverage factor 
is significantly and positively related to discretionary accruals. With regards to the 
economic sector, the logit analysis suggests that periphery sector firms display a 
higher degree of upwards earnings manipulation.   
The results for the logit test of association between firm characteristics and 
negative discretionary accruals shows analogous pattern for size and profitability 
factors. Similar to estimates in panel A, SIZE and ROA coefficients are both 
significantly and negatively related to firms with high negative discretionary accruals. 
We are not sure of the role of size in artificial dampening of earnings for small firms.  
However, the negative relationship between low profitability and lowering of earnings 
could be an indirect evidence of taking-the-bath hypothesis.  Given that lower 
profitable firms experience negative earnings in general, managers of these firms may 
have been reporting excessive negative earnings to set up positive earnings for future 
periods.  The coefficient estimate for CF panel B of table 7 is significantly positive.  
This suggests that firms with high cash flows are likely to adjust their earnings 
downwards, a possible effect of income-smoothing.  The significantly negative sign 
on LEVERAGE implies that firms with high leverage manage earnings downwards.  
It is interesting to note form the combined evidence from panel A and b that the effect 
of CF and LEVERAGE on the direction of earnings management is symmetric. 
The CIR coefficient in panel B of table 7 is unexpectedly positive indicating 
that firms with high levels of fixed assets are able to manipulate earnings, although in 
a negative fashion. Unlike the evidence for firms exhibiting positive discretionary 
accruals (panel A), there does not seem to be any difference between firms belonging 
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to either core or periphery sector when negative discretionary accruals are considered. 
While interpreting these results one must take into consideration the nature and design 
of the logit regressions.  Since the independent variable for a logit regression is 
dichotomized at the median, by construction, the logit test is of much broader nature 
as it has equal number of observations on each side of this binary classification.  
Therefore these results should be viewed in conjunction with results reported in tables 
4 and 5 and interpreted accordingly.  
The overall evidence, nonetheless, suggests that size and profitability are 
dominant features of firms engaging in earnings manipulation.  Further, smaller size 
low profitable firms are active in both income-increasing and decreasing earnings 
management. 
5. Supplementary Analysis 
We perform a variety of additional tests to verify the validity of our findings. 
The following is brief motivation and summary results for these additional tests.  
 
5.1. Alternative discretionary accrual measures 
We use Jones-based cash flow model in estimating discretionary accruals. 
Given the reason that discretion is easier to be exercised through credit sales then cash 
sales, Dechow et al. (1995) assume that all changes in credit sales result from 
earnings management and thus adjust the original Jones model by removing credit 
sales from revenues. In the literature, their model is referred as Modified Jones model. 
In a similar spirit, we re-estimate discretionary accruals by including the change in 








In Appendix, table A2, the results of this estimation is presented. We find that the 
predictive power of accrual model is not significantly increased with the mean 
adjusted R2 is 0.5305 which is in fact slightly lower than that from our base model 
(0.5351). In general, the coefficients in Modified Jones cash flow model are 
statistically significant at different levels with consistent signs as our base model. The 
mean coefficient on change in sales adjusted by the change on account receivable ( ) 
is positive, suggesting sales adjusted for account receivable is positively correlated 
with total accruals. We repeat all the earlier tests of earnings management using 
discretionary accruals estimated from this alternative model. In general, we obtain 
similar qualitative results.  
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5.2. Adjusting ROA versus including ROA as a regressor in accrual models 
While we control for the effect of earnings performance on discretionary 
accruals using medians, an alternative is to model accruals as a direct function of 
earnings performance (see Fields et al., 2001). We can add a performance measure, 
ROA, as an additional regressor to the accrual regression models as follows and 
estimate the discretionary accruals from this model (not reported).  
 
itititititititititit ROACFTAPPETAREVTATATAC εγγγγγ ++Δ++Δ+= −−−− 541312111 )/()/()/1(/  (5) 
 
However, we agree with Kothari et al (2005) that a linear regression approach 
to control for earnings performance is unlikely to perform as well as a performance-
adjusted technique. They test both methods and show that performance matching 
performs typically better than adding ROA as an additional regressor. They further 
point out that regression-based method is disadvantaged in that it imposes a linear 
function on the relation between earnings performance and accruals. Butler et al. 
(2004) find that firms experiencing extremely poor performance engage in liquidity-
related transactions and record asset impairment accruals and firms experiencing high 
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growth record large accruals. These accruals normally do not have a one-to-one 
income consequence. Therefore, we argue that our results from the performance-
adjusted method are likely to perform better than a linear regression approach.  
 
5.3. Fama and MacBeth (1973) method 
Accrual models in this study are estimated by industry and then by year, 
resulting in 63 regressions of industry-year pairs. One limitation of this estimation is 
that the means of estimated coefficients and t-statistics computed over all of the 
regressions, the observations in small sample groups are given a heavier weight than 
observations in large groups. For example, observations in Telecommunication & 
Utilities (133 observations) may have as much as approximately ten times the weight 
of an observation in Metals & Mining (1425 observations). This skewed weighting 
may possibly bias our findings. To examine whether the disparity in industry group 
sizes biases our results, we estimate year-by-year cross-sectional regressions and then 
estimate mean coefficients and t-values based on Fama and MacBetch (1973) method. 
In each of year-by-year regression, we include indicator variables for the nine 
industry groups to control for industry effect. Regressions based on this procedure 
result in 7 regressions instead of 63. As such, the sample sizes are larger and the 
weights of the observations are evenly distributed. We then repeat all the tests and 
confirm that this alternative procedure do not alter the general inferences presented 
earlier.  
5.4. Inclusion of a constant in the accrual models 
Consistent with the original Jones model, our estimations of the parameters of 
the modified Jones cash flow accruals models do not include a constant term in 
regressions. However, recent studies argue for including a constant term in accrual 
models. Kothari et al. (2005) assert that constant term can control additional 
heteroscedasticity.  We re-estimate our model with a constant included and estimate 
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the coefficients. Untabulated results indicate that the constant term is not significantly 
different from zero in most industry and years and thus we argue that the zero-
constant assumption is satisfied. Therefore, out results, based on a variation of Jones 
model without the constant term, should be acceptable.  
 
5.5. Earnings management evidence based on yearly horizons 
This study detects earnings management practice on an aggregate basis across 
Australian industries from 2000 to 2006. Although, strictly speaking, this is a not 
criticism of our methodology but a time-series examination of our results, we 
aggregate our discretionary accruals for each year during the investigation period. 
Results show that, overall, earnings management practices are evident in 2000, 2003, 
2005 and 2006. In particular, we find significant income-increasing earnings 
management occurred in the year of 2000, 2003 and 2006; while significant income-
decreasing earnings management has occurred in year 2005. An interesting question is 
why earnings management is prevalent among these years. Possible reasons could be 
a change of regulation, a significant impact of new tax law, or capital market reasons. 
A further investigation is beyond this study’s scope and we leave it to our future 
research.  
6. Conclusion 
We look for broad evidence of earnings management practice in Australia 
across nine GICS industrial groups during the period of 2000-2006. Results of this 
study indicate that some Australian firms engage in earnings management. Earnings 
management practice, in general, is prevalent in Energy, Metals & Mining, Industries, 
Health Care, Information Technology and Telecommunication & Utilities industries. 
When we classify the Australian economy into periphery and core sectors, the 
periphery sector firms exhibit a higher propensity for income-increasing earnings 
management behaviour than core sector firms. 
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We also investigate the characteristics of individual firms and their association 
to earnings management. We find strong evidence that firms which are small in size, 
and less profitable and more likely to engage in earnings management. There is some 
support, but not as strong, that high cash flow firms also tend to be associated with of 
earnings manipulation behaviour. In terms of direction of earnings management, we 
observe that smaller size and less profitable firms engage in both upward and 
downward earnings manipulation. 
Our findings shed some light on earnings management in Australia. 
Regulators may consider additional disclosures requirements from firms. Firm 
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Sample distribution by industry and year 
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1510 Material 366 7.56  2001 472 9.74 
1510 Metals & Mining 1425 29.42  2002 804 16.60 
2010-2030 Industrials 272 5.62  2003 841 17.36 
2510-2550 Consumer Discretionary 828 17.09  2004 819 16.91 
3010-3030 Consumer Staples 408 8.42  2005 893 18.44 
3510-3520 Health Care 478 9.87  2006 896 18.50 
4510-4530 Information Technology 610 12.59     
5010-5510 Telecommunication & Utilities 133 2.75     






Univariate tests of discretionary accruals (DA) 
 







Wilcoxon Signed Rank Test 
   __________________________ 
        
 Binomial Sign Test 
   ___________________________ 
 Mean DA t-stat. P Median DA     z-stat p  +/─      t-stat p 
Energy -0.0065 -1.2625 0.2077 -0.0138 -2846 0.0917 142/182 -20.0 0.0301 
Material 0.0018 0.4558 0.6488 -0.0002 226 0.9111 182/184 -1.0 0.9583 
Metals & Mining -0.0016 -0.6476 0.0517 -0.0011 -10172 0.0128 706/719 -6.5 0.0506 
Industrials -0.0096 -2.2805 0.0234 -0.0195 -3691 0.0043 103/169 -33.0 <.0001 
Consumer Discretionary 0.0018 0.6592 0.5100 0.0020 4010 0.5605 424/404 10.0 0.5091 
Consumer Staples 0.0005 0.1334 0.8939 -0.0000 -83 0.9723 204/204 0 1.0000 
Health Care 0.0253 6.6505 <.0001 0.0243 19757 <.0001 308/170 69.0 <.0001 
Information Technology -0.0046 -1.2174 0.2239 -0.0128 -7675 0.0779 267/343 -38.0 0.0024 
Telecommunication & 
Utilities 
0.0423 4.9744 <.0001 0.0495 2019 <.0001 88/45 21.5 <.0001 
 
Discretionary accruals (DA) are obtained as the residual from Jones-based cash flow model (see Appendix A1) and 
adjusted by median earnings performance (Kasznik, 1999). The null hypotheses for t-test is that mean is zero, for 
the Wilcoxon signed rank test is that the median is zero and for the binomial sign test is that the proportion of 
















                      N=3623               
    ________________________ 
 
Periphery Sector 
                      N=1221                        





     
Groupings Mean Media
n 
Freq. Mean Median Freq. t-stat. p-value z-stat. p-value 
1.By values           
DA -0.0013 -0.0025  0.0122 0.0105  -4.53 <.0001 4.3144 <.0001 
|DA| 0.0683 0.0557  0.0746 0.0619  -3.56 0.0004 3.3669 0.0008 
2. By  extremes:           
High_DA 0.1445 0.1401 24% 0.1483 0.1454 28% -2.08 0.0381 2.0711 0.0383 
Low_DA 0.0131 0.0128 26% 0.0128 0.0120 22% 0.71 0.4801 -0.6800 0.4965 
           
3. By direction:           
+ DA 0.0689 0.0556 48% 0.0799 0.0649 54% -4.29 <.0001 4.0640 <.0001 
− DA -0.0676 -0.0558 52% -0.0682   -0.0596 46% 0.24 0.8135 -0.4160 0.6774 
 
Core sector consists of Energy, Material, Metals & Mining, Industrials, Consumer Discretionary, Consumer 
Staples. Periphery sector consists of Information technology, Health Care and Telecommunication & Utilities.   
Discretionary accruals (DA) are obtained as the residual from Jones-based cash flow model (see Appendix A1), 
and adjusted by median earnings performance (Kasznik, 1999). |DA| is absolute discretionary accruals.  High_DA 
and Low_DA are top and bottom quartile groups when DAs are ranked by their absolute values. +DA and –DA 
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  ______ 
 
CF 
    ______ 
 
CIR 




         
1  (Low) 483 0.0050 11.0010 0.5939 -0.0280 -0.0105 0.3135 0.1790 
2 483 0.0156 10.8462 0.5350 -0.0870 -0.0445 0.3307 0.1607 
3 483 0.0272 10.7449   0.4604 -0.0790 -0.0424 0.3025 0.1786 
4 484 0.0387 10.6980 0.8160 -0.0727 -0.0297 0.3313 0.1833 
5 483 0.0506 10.5247 1.3367 -0.1184 -0.0538 0.3499 0.1706 
6 483 0.0651 10.6953 0.6557 -0.0741 -0.0267 0.3686 0.1686 
7 484 0.0827 10.3428 1.1027 -0.1535 -0.0642 0.3563 0.1719 
8 483 0.1046 10.2200 3.3182 -0.0591 -0.0228 0.3837 0.1522 
9 483 0.1335 10.1800 3.3926 -0.1332 -0.0660 0.3490 0.1753 
10 (High) 483 0.1752 9.8603 2.2102 -0.4400 -0.2743 0.3597 0.1669 
         
t- test of       
Low=High 
(p-value) 













‘Abs_DA’ is absolute values of discretionary accruals (DA) are obtained as the residual from Jones-based cash 
flow model (see Appendix A1), and adjusted by median earnings performance (Kasznik, 1999). Portfolio ranking 
is based on decile portfolios based on abs_DA.  Means of each characteristic within each portfolio are reported. 
Size is the logarithm of the total assets at year end; GROWTH is the sales growth rate measured by the change of 
sales between from previous year; ROA is return on assets measured by net operating income divided by total 
assets; CF is the operating cash flows deflated by lagged total assets; CIR (capital intensity ratio) is the proportion 






























Firm Characteristics and Direction of Earnings Management 
 


















  ______ 
 
CF 
    ______ 
 
CIR 




         
1  (Low) 242 0.0052 11.0674 0.5381 -0.0307 -0.0062 0.3216 0.1941 
2 242 0.0159 10.7197 0.2661 -0.1144 -0.0803 0.3424 0.1440 
3 243 0.0276 10.7984 0.5417 -0.0715 -0.0498 0.3205 0.1667 
4 242 0.0394 10.5196 1.0057 -0.0863 -0.0585 0.3405 0.1806 
5 243 0.0514 10.2229 1.1596 -0.1493 -0.0992 0.3619 0.1639 
6 242 0.0661 10.3723 0.6626 -0.0969 -0.0899 0.4098 0.1735 
7 243 0.0847 10.1449 0.3689 -0.3182 -0.2809 0.4346 0.1819 
8 242 0.1077 10.0800 0.9263 -0.0759 -0.1118 0.4011 0.1543 
9 243 0.1380 9.8021 4.1802 -0.1207 -0.1340 0.3469 0.2085 
10 (High) 242 0.1829 9.5033 3.9484 -0.6636 -0.5137 0.3622 0.1923 
t- test of       
Low=High 
(p-value) 






























  ______ 
 
CF 
    ______ 
 
CIR 




         
1  (Low ) 243 -0.0047 10.9566 0.6289 -0.0282 -0.0196 0.2988 0.1674 
2 241 -0.0153 10.9526 0.7781 -0.0462 0.0013 0.3280 0.1770 
3 242 -0.0267 10.6817 0.4288 -0.0941 -0.0385 0.2830 0.1877 
4 242 -0.0380 10.9140 0.5737 -0.0714 -0.0105 0.3225 0.1833 
5 242 -0.0499 10.8124 1.5559 -0.0748 -0.0001 0.3447 0.1763 
6 242 -0.0642 10.9584 0.7343 -0.0524 0.0328 0.3287 0.1655 
7 242 -0.0810 10.5653 1.5855 0.0026 0.1308 0.2868 0.1530 
8 242 -0.1017 10.4105 5.2099 -0.0336 0.0846 0.3739 0.1594 
9 242 -0.1293 10.4236 2.9122 -0.1570 -0.0204 0.3160 0.1427 
10 (High) 242 -0.1668 10.3254 0.6090 -0.2072 -0.0046 0.3663 0.1421 
t- test of       
Low=High 
(p-value) 










  -1.00 
(0.3159) 
‘+DA’ and ‘–DA’ are signed values of discretionary accruals (DA) obtained as the residual from Jones-based cash 
flow model (see Appendix A1) and adjusted by mean earnings performance (Kasznik, 1999). The total number of 
+DA and –DA in the above table are approximately equal because of this standardisation-by-mean DA procedure. 
Portfolio ranking is based on decile portfolios based on all observations within +DA (Panel A) or –DA (Panel B).  
Observations means of each characteristic within each portfolio are reported. Size is the logarithm of the total 
assets at year end; GROWTH is the sales growth rate measured by the change of sales between from previous year; 
ROA is return on assets measured by net operating income divided by total assets; CF is the operating cash flows 
deflated by lagged total assets; CIR (capital intensity ratio) is the proportion of net property plant and equipment to 
















Model 1 (Magnitude) 
Dep. variable = ‘Abs_DA’ 
                 ___________________________________________________________________________________ 
     
 Coefficient                        S.E.          Wald Chi-Sq            Pr>Chi-Sq 
     
Constant 2.1245 0.2801            57.5135           <.0001 
SIZE -0.2250 0.0263            72.9526           <.0001 
GROWTH 0.0217 0.0112              3.7601           0.0525 
ROA -0.5580 0.2744             4.1353           0.0420 
CF -0.7939 0.3384             5.5039           0.0190 
CIR 0.8056 0.2051            15.4221           <.0001 
LEVERAGE 0.1057 0.1523             0.4816           0.4877 
SECTOR  0.1937 0.0589           10.8128           0.0010 
     





   




   
Prediction accuracy 59%    
Discretionary accruals (DA) are obtained as the residual from Jones-based cash flow model (see Appendix A1) and 
adjusted by median earnings performance (Kasznik, 1999). The dependent variable in this model is ‘Abs_DA’=1 if 
firm observation is in top quartile of when sorted by absolute discretionary accruals and 0 otherwise. SIZE is the 
logarithm of the total assets at year end; GROWTH is the sales growth rate measured by the change of sales 
between from previous year; ROA is return on assets measured by net operating income divided by total assets; CF 
is the operating cash flows deflated by lagged total assets; CIR (capital intensity ratio) is the proportion of net 
property plant and equipment to total assets; LEVERAGE is total debt to total assets. SECTOR is a binary variable 




Table 7  
Logistic regression of firm characteristics on directions of EM 
 




Model 1: Dep. variable = ‘+DA’ 
                 ___________________________________________________________________________________ 
     
 Coefficient      Standard Error          Wald Chi-Sq            Pr>Chi-Sq 
Constant 1.1189 0.2893              14.9566             0.0001 
SIZE -0.1499 0.0273              30.1600             <.0001 
GROWTH 0.0101 0.0075                1.8058             0.1790 
ROA -0.7386 0.1752              17.7721             <.0001 
CF -1.6677 0.3858              18.6867             <.0001 
CIR 0.2382 0.2221                1.1496             0.2836 
LEVERAGE 0.4328 0.2136                4.1071             0.0427 
SECTOR 0.2056 0.0578              12.6793             0.0004 





   
Goodness of fit 
(p-value) 
  113.7409 
(<.0001) 
   
Prediction accuracy 77%    




Model 2: Dep. variable = ‘-DA’ 
                 ___________________________________________________________________________________ 
     
 Coefficient      Standard Error          Wald Chi-Sq            Pr>Chi-Sq 
     
Constant -0.3701 0.3027                 1.4955              0.2214 
SIZE -0.0360 0.0266                 3.1420              0.0763 
GROWTH 0.0096 0.0054                 1.8294              0.1762 
ROA -8.1411 0.6269             168.6597              <.0001 
CF 9.9196 0.7593             170.6716              <.0001 
CIR 1.0271 0.1996               26.4929              <.0001 
LEVERAGE -0.4351 0.2034                 4.5746              0.0325 
SECTOR  -0.0002 0.0646                 0.0000              0.9975 
     





   




   
Prediction accuracy 71%    
 
Discretionary accruals (DA) are obtained as the residual from Jones-based cash flow model (see Appendix A1) and 
adjusted by median earnings performance (Kasznik, 1999). In Model 1 the dependent variable is 1 if firm 
observation is in upper half when sorted amongst positive discretionary accruals and 0 otherwise. In Model 2 the 
dependent variable is 1 if firm observation is from upper half when sorted amongst negative DAs and 0 otherwise. 
Size is the logarithm of the total assets at year end; GROWTH is the sales growth rate measured by the change of 
sales between from previous year; ROA is return on assets measured by net operating income divided by total 
assets; CF is the operating cash flows deflated by lagged total assets; CIR (capital intensity ratio) is the proportion 
of net property plant and equipment to total assets; LEVERAGE is total debt to total assets. SECTOR is a binary 
variable of 1 if a firm is in the periphery sector and 0 otherwise (we estimate periphery sector and use core sector 








Jones Cash Flow model for accrual estimation 
 
ititititititititit CFaTAPPEaTAREVaTAaTATAC ε+Δ++Δ+= −−−− 41312111 )/()/()/1(/  
The modified Jones cash flow model is estimated for each industry group in each year (N refers to 63 
industry-year pairs regressions). TACit is total accruals being the difference between net operating 
income and operating cash flows form DataStream for firm i in year t. ΔREV is change in net sales, 
from year t-1 to t. PPEit is gross property, plant and equipment (calculated as net property, plant and 
equipment plus depreciation and depletion). ΔCFit is change in operating cash flows.  TAit-1 is the total 
assets in year t-1. ***, **, and * indicate statistical significance at 1%, 5% and 10% respectively (two 








































































































Modified Jones Cash Flow model for accrual estimation 
 
ititititititititititit CFaTAPPEaTARECTAREVaTAaTATAC ε+Δ++Δ−Δ+= −−−−− 413112111 )/()//()/1(/  
The modified Jones cash flow model is estimated for each industry group in each year (N refers to 63 
industry-year pairs regressions). TACit is total accruals being the difference between net operating 
income and operating cash flows form DataStream for firm i in year t. ΔREV is change in net sales, 
from year t-1 to t. PPEit is gross property, plant and equipment (calculated as net property, plant and 
equipment plus depreciation and depletion). ΔCFit is change in operating cash flows.  TAit-1 is the total 
assets in year t-1. ΔRECit-1 is the change in account receivable. ***, **, and * indicate statistical 





































































































Adj- 2R  63  0.5305 0.4742 0.3289 0.2702 0.8881  
 
 
